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Abstract

The failed attempt to rescue hostages during the 1972 Olympics in Munich Germany led to the
unnecessary and terrible loss of lives of both hostages and captors. Ever since then, great efforts
have been undertaken by law enforcement professionals and researchers to develop clear
protocols to help insure the safety of all involved parties. Negotiations, one tactic among several,
represents a non-violent alternative to armed assault that can be used to obtain the safe release of
hostages and the capture of unharmed hostage takers. Drawing on my forty year career
experience in California Corrections, this paper argues for the power of dialogue as an essential
tool for the peaceful resolution of a crisis involving people, including hostage situations.
Examining six notorious case studies of hostage situations from 1972 to the present, this work
highlights a number of negotiation strategies. These six events exemplify both peaceful and
tragic outcomes, making it clear that all too often the outcome corresponds directly to how
effectively conflict-resolution and negotiation tactics are employed. Through analysis and
critique of these case studies, this work makes evident that the attitude of the team leadership, as
well as the amount of cooperation and coordination between the negotiation team and the assault
team, proves critical to the peaceful resolution of a hostage situation and to the saving of lives.
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Hostage Negotiations in lieu Armed Assault

Introduction

Hostage negotiations is the process used by law enforcement personnel to obtain the
release of persons in a peaceful manner who are being held against their will. Whenever a
hostage situation is identified there are two options, employee negotiators to communicate with
hostage taker to release hostages or order an armed assault using lethal force to kill or capture the
hostage takers. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that negotiating for the release of
hostages will minimize the chance of injury or death to hostages, law enforcement personnel and
hostage takers. Information on several hostage events will be provided to demonstrate that
hostage situations can be resolved through negotiations as an alternative to lethal force. It will
also demonstrate that even when all the rules, good judgement and experience are applied by the
negotiation and tactical teams, mishaps happen.
Negotiations
This research paper will limit its findings to hostage and barricade incidents which is
differentiated from a kidnapping. During a hostage incident the hostage taker “physically holds
another person(s) by threat or restraint as leverage to try to force the authorities to meet
demands” (Slatkin 82). A barricaded subject has no persons being held and in effect they are
holding themselves as hostage. They want law enforcement authorities to go away. The
distinction between hostage taking and kidnapping is that the hostage takers and victim(s)
location is known. During a kidnapping, the perpetrator’s identity and victim(s) location and fate
are unknown.
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Terrorist hostage situations will not be covered in detail. A few brief comments are in
order to define a major differences in the treatment of hostages when in captivity. Terrorists take
hostages to make a statement and don’t intend to negotiate reasonably. Terrorist will hold their
hostages in isolation, place covers over their heads or have them face a wall in an attempt to
dehumanize them. In the book, On Killing by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, he reasons
that “it is easier to kill a person if you don’t have to look them into the eyes when killing”
(Grossman 128). Attempts to negotiate with terrorists still should be pursued, hopefully that
some common ground can be reached.
Prior to the Summer Olympic tragedy at Munich, Germany in 1972, there was no good
rescue model to resolve a hostage crisis. When a hostage situation was reported, the nearest law
enforcement swat team or available police officers would storm the area killing or capturing the
perpetrators. The problem with this method, innocent people also got killed.
Lt. Frank Bolz, New York City Police Department went to Munich to study the problems
German authorities had in their attempt to obtain the release of the Israeli athletes. With the
information he obtained, he wrote a structured procedure for hostage management for New York
City law enforcement. Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wrote their crisis
management procedures modeled after the plan written by Bolz.
Crisis Management Units (CMU) patterned after the Bolz plan have specific procedures
to follow for the incident commander, tactical squad and negotiators. All members involved in
the Crisis Management Team are trained. All routine onsite decisions on tactics or strategy are
approved by the incident commander. The CMU will be well staffed with negotiators. An
experienced negotiator will be assigned as the team leader. He or she will monitor all negotiation
strategies, keeping the incident commander informed on progress. Additionally, the Negotiation
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Operation Center (NOC) will be staffed with four or five additional negotiators to act as relief
negotiators, record keeping and assuring that they have working telephones and tape recorders.
Easels are set up to post notes on the progress to keep everyone updated.
Hostage negotiation, unlike negotiations used in advancing a career or solving a
labor strike, is a life or death drama. The negotiator in hostage negotiations has one goal and that
is to save lives while obtaining the release of hostages through meaningful dialogue. “The
traditional belief that continues is that negotiations means adversarial confrontation”(Liviton 54).
It is critical that negotiators attempting to secure the release of hostages not inject personal
feelings into the process. They must resist from responding to insults by the hostage taker.
Adversarial confrontations can be cause for failure. There are no short cuts in negotiations. It is a
matter of listening, patience, gaining trust, perseverance, good judgment and luck. Having an
understanding of the perpetrators problems and background helps. Experienced negotiators are
confident they can succeed if left alone to concentrate on their job. The negotiator also feels the
pressure, knowing if the negotiations fail, he or she will be blamed.
News Media
As it relates to Hostage Negotiations, anytime there is a hostage situation in the United
States the news media is likely to be interested. It is up to the authority where the hostage crisis is
located to determine how the media will be addressed. If the hostage crisis is located in the public
sector, law enforcement teams will respond to media needs. Those hostage situations in a prison
will be the responsibility of the Prison Administration.
In the public sector, efforts will be made to isolate the media to keep them from interfering
with the negotiation process. Phone lines and other means of communications will be disabled to
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disallow any outside intrusion by the media. Throw phones or a bullhorn will be used to negotiate
with the perpetrator. Communication in a prison setting is much easier to control. Perimeter
security and control of phone banks limits access.
It is extremely important that the hostage taker has only one source of contact with the
outside world, and that is the negotiator. Often it is not known if there are radios or television sets
within the perpetrators access. In the Munich, Germany Summer Olympics, a television crew was
allowed in close proximity to the apartment where the Israeli hostages were being held. The
attempt by the German police to assault the building was broadcast live on television and alerted
the Palestinians, aborting the rescue attempt.
Reporters have a job to cover what they consider is reportable news. Most law enforcement
agencies and prison administrations have a Public Information Officer (PIO) that work as liaison
between the authority in charge of the hostage situation and the media. Past practice has
demonstrated that if reporters feel there is an unnecessary blackout on information they will
develop their news story on rumors. If for some reason, information is withheld until the hostage
crisis has been resolved, the PIO should provide the necessary information, to allow the news
reporter to develop the news story.
The media can also be a useful tool working with the incident commander and negotiation
team. Negotiators often need some trade-offs to persuade the perpetrator to release a hostage or
allow a hostage to speak on the phone. In the event religion is involved or the hostage taking is a
result of an anti-government philosophy, perpetrators have offered to release a hostage if allowed
to go on social media to argue their cause. Proper management of news releases and cooperation
with the media can be critical and beneficial.
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The following summaries of the different hostage events provides a context for
evaluation of the different styles of management and philosophies of the authorities in charge of
managing the crisis. An objective analysis of the hostage events covered should settle the
argument, negotiate or assault. Each hostage incident is different. The same can be said of the
crisis management teams and team leaders. Either option, use of force or negotiations, is
applicable to hostage situations. The exception occurs when verified intelligence confirms that
hostages are being harmed at the onset of the crisis. Such a scenario necessitates immediate
rescue action.
Hostage Event I: Munich, Germany Summer Olympics
The first hostage event under consideration is the incident in Munich, Germany, in 1972.
There were two countries involved, Israel and Germany, multiple decision makers, a
dysfunctional communication procedure and a rescue team that had no training to manage a
hostage crisis. The tragic outcome that evolved from this incident convinced law enforcement
groups in the United States there was a need for training and maintaining a hostage crisis
management team.
It all started at 4:30 a.m.. on the morning of September 5, 1972 when a band of eight
Palestinians, called “Black September” took eleven Israeli athletes and coaches hostage at the
Summer Olympics in Munich, Germany. According to Author, Simon Reeve, in his book, One
Day in September, there was very little known about the Black September group prior to
Munich. However, it wasn’t long before the western world came to know more about them after
Munich. Black September, continued to make the news for about one more year involved in
militant and terrorist type activities.
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The name, Black September, was derived from the September 1970 conflict in Jordan
when King Hussein expelled thousands of Palestinians from his country.1 In reviewing different
documentation about the history of Black September, it is noted that there are differences in
opinions in reference to their identity. Some authors refer to Black September as a militant group
while others refer to them as terrorists. A leader of Black September claimed, “There was not an
organization. There was a cause, Black September. It was a Palestinian state of mind” (Reeve
35).
Relaxed Olympic security allowed the Palestinians to enter the Olympic Village where
the athletes were staying. Two of the Palestinians had previously managed to obtain jobs at the
Olympic Village. This allowed them to learn the layout of the Village and the exact location of
the apartments occupied by the Israeli team.
The Palestinians approached the Israeli athlete’s apartment in the Olympic Village
without being detected. They knocked on the door of the first apartment and when the occupant
opened the door and saw men with weapons, he attempted to keep the door shut while warning
his fellow team mates. He was immediately shot and killed. A second athlete was killed while
attempting to defend himself with a knife. The Palestinians managed to take nine hostages.
Eighteen other team members escaped.
When the German authorities became aware of the hostage situation they set up a crisis
center. Contact was made with Issa, the leader of the Palestinian group. Issa agreed to allow
Munich Police Chief, Manfred Schreiber, and a small delegation of German and foreign officials
to approach him. After introductions and some discussion, Issa informed the German delegation

1

The Black September organization was founded in 1970 and closed down September 1973.
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he would provide them with his demands. Soon after the meeting the written demands were
thrown out a window of the apartment.
Their demands were the release of 200 Arabs held prisoner in Israeli jails, the release of
the leaders of the leftist terrorist group, Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, and the Japanese
terrorist, Kozo Okamo. Issa also insisted they and the Israeli hostages must be flown out of West
Germany to any Arab nation except Lebanon or Jordan. They warned the authorities that they
had three hours to comply. Failure to meet the deadline would result in the execution of hostages
at the rate of two every thirty minutes.
When Israeli authorities were contacted on how to handle the hostage situation it was
agreed that the German authorities had full responsibility for the rescue. However, Prime
Minister, Golda Meir, of Israel made it clear not to negotiate for Israel to release prisoners. Israel
would not object to providing the Palestinians safe conduct from the country if the hostages were
freed. German Interior Minister, Hans Dietrich took charge of the negotiations, but was limited
in the decisions he could make. The Palestinians would not accept any amount of money or
exchange of Israeli athletes for Germans.
To further complicate the negotiation process, the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt,
flew to Munich and involved himself in the negotiations. He personally mandated that neither the
hostages nor the hostage takers leave Germany. Prior to Chancellor Brandt’s order there were
serious thoughts about flying the hostages and hostage takers to an Arab country. With the latest
direction from the Chancellor, and previous mandate from Golda Meir not to release prisoners,
the German planners were left only with the option to use force to rescue the Israeli athletes.
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The German authorities’ plan was to convince the Palestinians they were going to leave
with their hostages and fly to an Arab country. Issa was told his group and the hostages would be
transported to helicopters to fly to Furstenfeldbruck, a West German airbase sixteen miles
outside of Munich. A Boeing 727 and crew were standing by to fly them and the Israelis to an
Arab Country. Issa agreed to the plan.
The actual plan was designed to make the Palestinians vulnerable on their way to the
airplane where German police could effectively ambush them. The central part of the plan was
German police officers posing as the flight crew would either capture or kill Issa and his
accomplice. Everything was going as planned until Issa entered the airplane. The German police
posing as the flight crew had abandoned their positions without informing their command center.
They saw no place to hide or protect themselves from gunfire or grenades. They saw their role as
a suicide mission.
When Issa saw no flight crew, he anticipated a trap, shouted a warning and ran back to
the helicopters. In the ensuing chaos the police snipers and Palestinians exchanged shots and in a
short time all the Israeli athletes, five of the Palestinians including Issa, and one German police
officer were dead. Three Palestinians gave up and were captured. “The German rescue operation
was a criminally shambolic failure”. (Reeve p124)
Results and Critiques
Millions of people worldwide were watching the event on television. The Olympic
Committee had a large investment in the Games. There was some talk about cancelling the
games which increased the pressure on the German authorities to do something quickly. With the
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hostage situation located in the Olympic Village, the games would be disrupted or maybe
canceled altogether.
Did relocating the incident away from the Olympic site take priority over negotiations?
The German decision makers had to understand that their plan to use lethal assault would risk
lives.The critics of the failed rescue focused not only on the problems of the armed assault but
also on the failure to continue negotiations. A German delegation was able to communicate with
Issa soon after they took hostages. Issa had made it clear they did not want ransom money or an
exchange of German officials for Israelis as hostages. Their only stated goal was to exchange the
Israeli athletes for the release of specific prisoners from jail. Without the hostages, they had no
bargaining power. The deadlines to execute hostages passed at least four times, which should
have been a signal they wanted to keep the hostages alive. Negotiating and stalling for time may
have allowed the decision makers the opportunity to bring in resources from friendly Arab
nations to assist in the deal making.
Several years later the blame game still goes on when there are discussions on what some
participants call the “Olympic Massacre.” The Arabs blame Bonn. The German authorities blame
Golda Meir because of her refusal to allow them to negotiate the release of prisoners. The
Israelis blame the German authorities for not accepting Israel’s offer to send to Germany their
elite counter terrorism team. The German authorities deny the Israeli team was offered. The
German decision makers also had to contend with the Olympics in progress.
The Germans were concerned prior to the Olympics about the Israeli team safety without
having knowledge of any plot against them. Unfortunately, the Israelis also had some concerns
about going to Germany placing loyalty to the Olympics over safety which led to their demise.
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Hostage Event II: The Hate Factory
This event was characterized by Author B.G. Hirliman in his book the The Hate Factory.
On Friday February 1, 1980 a riot broke out at the Penitentiary of New Mexico that lasted for
thirty six hours. When it was over, there were thirty three inmates dead, all killed by fellow
inmates.
Prior to the 1980 riot there was an independents study of the New Mexico Penitentiary
made by a California Correctional Official for the American Justice Institute. The study revealed a
poorly administered prison with multiple problems. The official called the prison one of “the most
poorly administered he ever encountered” (Hirliman 13).
When the New Mexico Attorney General investigated conditions in the penitentiary a year
later, nothing had been done to upgrade the management. His public report concluded the
penitentiary had a “history of instability and poor planning”( Hirliman13). Management was
rampant with “factionalism, poor communication, and apathy” (Hirliman 13). One of the worst
problems was the volatile condition of overcrowding and misuse of dormitories for medium
security prisoners. He concluded that by staffing the penitentiary with high school graduates,
without the proper training for prison work, state officials were playing Russian Roulette with the
lives of inmates, staff and the public. His concerns were justified. When the inmates felt the
current conditions weren’t going to improve they started planning for a way to get attention to
their plight.
The Aryan Nations, a white supremacist group, and the “Chicanos”, prison slang for the
Mexican inmate population, were drinking prison-made brew while planning a riot. Their main
complaints were overcrowding, the misuse of the maximum unit to punish inmates and the bullying
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by the Mexican staff clique that controlled the penitentiary. Lack of security training and
inexperienced correctional officers allowed the inmates to take the first step. They observed that
correctional officers making the early morning count left a security door unlocked. This allowed
inmates to take hostages. With the captive correctional officer’s keys, they proceeded to capture
seven out of the fifteen night officers. Captured staff members were stripped of their clothes,
threatened and beaten. They also formed inmate death squads to seek out those inmates they
identified as informers, torturing or killing them all. The atrocities committed by the inmates were
beyond sanity. With the extra keys from the captured staff, they took over and destroyed most of
the internal sections of the penitentiary.
The Warden, the Deputy Warden, and the Superintendent of Correctional Security arrived
at the penitentiary gatehouse, outside the perimeter fence shortly after the riot began. The inmates
made their first contact by telephone to the Deputy Warden at approximately 5:00 a.m. The inmate
callers were clear in their message: We are not trying to escape. We have hostages and if the
National Guard or police assault the institution, the staff hostages will be killed. Their initial
demands were to have a meeting with the Governor and the news media in order to express their
complaints. Other subsequent demands included a public forum to discuss the poor food,
mismanagement, overcrowding, inadequate recreation and the resignations of the current
administration.
The stage was set. The inmates communicated that they had hostages they would kill if
there was an assault. The administrative response was that if even one hostage was killed there
would be an assault that would be worse than Attica.2 Threatening dialogue between the inmates
and administration left few choices, armed assault or negotiations. The decision was made that in
2

On September 13, 1971, there was a riot at the Attica Correctional Institute, New York State. “Ten hostages and
twenty nine inmates were killed by correction’s officers and state troopers” (Wicker 318)
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order to get the staff out safely and gain control of the penitentiary, they would have to negotiate
and compromise.
On their own initiative, the inmates were able to reach the Governor’s office by phone
inside the penitentiary wherein they secured a commitment they would not be assaulted. As the
negotiations proceeded with the administration, the inmates also were granted a demand for a
news media interview in exchange for a seriously wounded correctional officer. An NBC reporter
was allowed a forty minute interview with inmates inside the institution.
Results and Critiques
With an experienced Correctional Administrator from another state summoned to assess
the penitentiary followed by the New Mexico Attorney General a year later investigating the
conditions, it should have alerted high ranking Correctional Officials attention. The reports
collectively highlighted the poor administration, poor planning, deplorable conditions and the
instability of the penitentiary. Furthermore, the problems highlighted at the penitentiary “laid
mainly at the doorstep of Management” (Hirliman 127).
It would be reasonable to believe that both official reports reached the Secretary of
Corrections and the Governor’s office. It is protocol among agencies to ensure that informational
copies are distributed to all involved departments or agencies. Administrators in the chain of
command in the New Mexico State Department of Corrections, should also have had an indication
the penitentiary was being mismanaged prior to the reports received from outside sources.
With the penitentiary’s management being named at the root of the problems, it was not in
the best interest of the State Department of Corrections or the Governor’s office to ignore the
reports. Without Correctional Headquarters taking immediate action to correct the problems
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identified, it was “business as usual”, until the inmates desperate for improvement took matters in
their own hands.
However, the blame for the riot and death of thirty three inmates goes beyond just blaming
the penitentiary management. State Correctional Administration shares some of the blame for not
being responsible in properly overseeing penitentiary operations. There is no excuse for a Warden
or their supervisors in headquarters saying, “I didn’t know”. Their job responsibility is to know
and make corrections and provide resources as needed. They have the responsibility to ensure that
there are adequate funds for hiring and training staff, inmate educational and recreational
programs, proper food and health care.
Whenever an institution reaches the level of mismanagement as described in The Hate
Factory, improvements would have to include drastic changes in management and supervisory
staff. Responsibility starts at the top. Administrators set the tone for prison operations by their
actions, on the treatment of prisoners and the importance of programs that will benefit inmates
upon their release. Without guidance from the top, attitude of management and supervisory staff
will prevail.
The end results, the rioters got most of what they demanded. Inmates got trade-offs from
staff for bringing out injured officers. Some of the inmate spoke-persons got transfers to their liking.
Other concessions were no segregation for the rioters. They were allowed to meet with the press,
and the Governor’s office was involved. Only those that could be identified in the murder of another
inmate were held accountable. The thirteen officers who were held as hostages resigned.
In spite of the fact that thirty three inmate lives were lost, no assault took place, no shots
were fired, inmate killings ceased and no staff lives were lost once negotiations were started.
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Negotiations proved that with some compromise they can be successful, even with the most
calloused criminals. Dr. James Watson, Medical Investigator summed up the motivation behind the
killings, “absolute unbelievable rage” (Hirliman 118).
Hostage Event III: Sperryville
The following is the profile of a hostage situation involving a man, a common law wife
and son that had an unfortunate ending. This event is indicative of a hostage incident where the
crisis management team does everything correctly, but nevertheless the crisis resulted in a death.
Negotiations are unpredictable when dealing with terrorists who never intend to release their
hostage, the unstable person who is angry and determined to kill their hostage and the suicide by
cop. The negotiator’s role changes as he or she sets the stage for the final assault which violates a
personal principle, which is to “save lives”. Negotiators know that in order to be effective in
negotiations, they should never lie. However, on rare occasions they have to lie to maneuver the
perpetrator into a position to allow lethal force. This lie is referred to as the “Last Lie” (Van Zandt
59).
The Sperryville hostage crisis happened in April 1988. An ex-husband, Charlie Lief,
abducted his estranged common law wife, Cheryl Hart and their four year old son Charlie from her
parent’s home in Connecticut. Lief felt Cheryl and little Charlie belonged to him. Cheryl had
previously secured a restraining order that Lief ignored. After an extensive search by the local
police, FBI and the Virginia State Police, Lief and his family were located in a vacated home
outside of Sperryville, Virginia. When members of the FBI swat team discovered the fugitives in an
upstairs bedroom they found Lief holding little Charlie and Cheryl in front of him with a gun to
Cheryl’s head. “Back off” he yelled, “or I’ll kill her”(Noesner 7). The swat team leader, who had
some negotiation training responded with, “we’re backing off. Nobody is going to get hurt”
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(Noesner 7). He then called for the FBI tactical operations specialist. A FBI command center was
set up in the firehouse in Sperryville, where all hostage rescue efforts would be coordinated. The
primary negotiator assigned was Gary Noesner.
Arriving at the scene, Noesner relieved the temporary negotiator, who gave him an update
on what had transpired between him and Lief. The change of negotiators was brought to Lief’s
attention. Noesner assured Lief there was no intention to hurt him or his family. Every effort was
made to convince Lief that he needed to put down his firearms and release his family. It appeared
Lief was becoming more rationale and would end his threats against Cheryl. However, as time
progressed his mood changed. His voice grew louder and angrier, shouting downstairs that, “I have
the gun against her head”(Noesner 15) and am about to pull the trigger. At this point, Noesner felt
that Lief was spiraling out of control and he feared the next sound he heard would be a gunshot.
Noesner’s evaluation was that Lief was going to eventually kill Cheryl and a new plan
was needed. Lief was aware there was a helicopter close by and asked Noesner to fly him out. In
order to get Lief into a position where a sniper could take him out, Noesner agreed with Lief. He
would arrange for him and his family to leave by helicopter to a location of his choice. The plan
was approved at the highest level. The last words Noesner said to Lief were, “Good luck Charlie, I
hope you and Cheryl will be okay”. Charlie replied, “Goodbye” (Noesner 22).
As Lief walked to the helicopter with his son tied to his back pointing his rifle at Cheryl’s
head it all ended with a sniper shot. Lief was killed instantly and his son, “little Charlie”and Cheryl
were safe. After the fact, Noesner acknowledged to his wife that a “kind of bond”(Noesner 23) had
been formed with Lief. He felt that he had to do what was necessary to save two lives and felt “no
remorse”(Noesner 23). His final comment to a colleague was, “I’m fine” then added, “But I’m mad
as hell at that son of a bitch for making me do it” (Noesner 23).
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Results and Critiques
It was an unfortunate ending with the loss of a life. Though, it should be noted that it took
the skills of a negotiator to set up the use of lethal force. After the conclusion made by the
negotiator, that Cheryl and the son were in imminent danger, a rescue attempt had to be
implemented quickly. The Tactical Squad had no other option than assault, which had the
potential for several persons, tact squad and the Lief family, to be injured or killed.
The decision to use lethal force rather than continue negotiations was not final until
approved by the special agent in charge and the FBI personnel legal office. The legal office
mandated that the negotiator ask Lief one more time if he would come out peacefully. Lief’s final
refusal to surrender peacefully activated the plan to use lethal force.
Allowing Lief to fly to a location of his choice with Cheryl and his son would not have
ended the crisis. Lief’s family would still be subjected to Lief’s irrational behavior and threats.
Additionally, law enforcement still had the responsibility to arrest Lief for his current criminal
behavior. It also would have been an irresponsible decision to allow the helicopter pilot to fly Lief
anywhere. The pilot would have been very vulnerable to Lief’s unpredictable behavior.
Hostage Event IV: Ruby Ridge
The incident involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States
Marshall Service (USMS) beginning August 21, 1992 is a classic example on the lack of
intelligence, misuse of strategy and force by the two Federal Agencies. Ruby Ridge was the site in
northern Idaho where U.S. Marshalls and FBI agents attempted to arrest Randy Weaver, a former
factory worker and a U.S. combat engineer. Randy Weaver was just another malcontent that
identified with anti-government groups and chose to isolate himself and his family from

Merkle 22.
mainstream society. Prior to the attempted arrest, Randy and his wife Vickie had already made the
decision to move to a remote mountain area where they could survive and home school their three
children. They bought twenty acres of property and built a cabin on a hillside below Ruby Ridge
in Boundary County, Idaho.
Circumstances that led up to charges being filed against Weaver were based on
information from a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) informant. The informant
claimed Weaver attempted to sell him two illegal sawed off shotguns. Both the source of
information and the information itself were questionable. Furthermore, the ATF agent in charge
initially attempted to use the illegal shotguns issue to coerce Weaver into being an informant
against the Aryan Nations, a white supremacist group. When Weaver refused, the ATF agent filed
charges.
ATF agents eventually arrested Weaver and informed him of the charges and his court date
was set for February 19, 1991. He was released on bail. Subsequently, there was some confusion
between the court clerk and Weaver’s attorney about changing his court appointment. As a result,
Weaver did not get the information on the change of court dates and he did not show up in court as
scheduled. The Judge issued a bench warrant for failure to appear. As the law enforcement arm of
the federal court, it was the duty of the U.S. Marshalls to bring in the fugitive.
By this time, Weaver’s presumed potential for violence, as circulating within the
Department of Justice, (DOJ) was highly exaggerated. There were rumors that he was a Green
Beret, collected all kind of firearms, booby trapped and tunneled his property and would shoot
anyone on site. The U.S. Marshalls assigned to the case, believing Weaver was a violent person,
did not want to risk a lethal confrontation. They wanted Weaver to surrender peacefully, stand trial
on the weapons charges and his failure to appear at the correct trial date.
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Had Weave agreed to talk with the U.S. Marshalls they could have explained the due
process procedures applicable to his court case and hopefully he would have responded to reason.
However, Weaver refused to talk to any negotiators including third party intermediators or his
legal counsel. The next step was to send a group of armed U.S Marshalls into the area to
apprehend Weaver and draw him away from his cabin.
On August 21, 1992 a surveillance team of six U.S. Marshalls dressed in cameos and
carrying weapons climbed up Ruby Ridge to scout out areas where they might arrest Weaver. The
Weaver’s dogs detected their presence and alerted Weaver’s son Sammy, fourteen, and Weaver’s
friend, Kevin Harris. Sammy and Harris followed the dogs to the edge of the forest. This is where
the agents, Sammy, and Harris had a confrontation. It started with a U.S. Marshall shooting one of
the dogs. Accounts differ at this point but when the shooting stopped, one U.S. Marshall and
Sammy, were dead. Sammy was shot in the back running away from the fight. Harris sustained a
wound.
The FBI, learning of the incident, sent their Hostage Response Team (HRT) with agent
Dick Rogers in charge. Rogers had all the resources available at his disposal to resolve the
incident with either negotiations or assault. Even though there were no known hostages at the
time, the negotiation team was on site to negotiate a surrender if needed.
On August 22, second day of the siege, sniper/observer teams were deployed with
negotiators. Rogers was known to be an effective tactical commander, but not a fan of
negotiations. When briefing the tactical team, it was obvious that this was going to be a tactical
operation. He immediately revised the rules of engagement to allow snipers to kill any adult
carrying a gun without first asking for a surrender. A sniper interpreted the new rules as a “green
light” and shot and wounded Randy Weaver outside his cabin. The sniper then took a second shot
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that went through the cabin door and killed Vickie Weaver, who was holding her ten month old
baby in her arms. The same shot hit Harris in the chest wounding him seriously. Contrary to FBI
policy, no verbal warning was issued.
The stand-off was ultimately resolved by three sympathetic civilian negotiators. Harris
surrendered on August 30th. Weaver and his daughters surrendered the next day. Weaver and
Harris were arrested, and at the trial were acquitted of all charges with one exception. Weaver was
convicted for missing his court date for which he was sentenced to 18 months and fined $10,000
and credited with time served. He spent an additional 4 months in prison.
During the trial, defense counsel alleged wrong doings by the ATF, USMS, and FBI. This
was cause for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to create a “Ruby Ridge” Task Force. They
delivered a 542 page report on June 10, 1994, to the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR). The report was never officially released.
Results and Critiques
The circumstance leading up to the Ruby Ridge incident is directly related to the
`mishandling of information and inappropriate application of authority by three law enforcement
agencies. The chain of events leading to the tragedy of three people dead started with an ATF
agent using his authority in an attempt to coerce Weaver into becoming an informant. When
Weaver refused, ATF filed gun charges against him. They also claimed that Weaver was a bank
robber with criminal convictions. Those claims were false at the time. “Weaver was not a suspect
in any bank robbery” (Wikipedia 3). Additionally, a memo circulating within the DOJ,
exaggerated Weaver’s potential violence which was never substantiated. The U.S. Marshall’s
office never made any attempt to assess the credibility of the various people who gave information
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about Weaver. The problem of misinformation made it difficult for other law enforcement
agencies to accurately assess Weaver’s potential for violence.
Weaver had a distrust for government before the accusations were made about selling
illegal guns. The gun charges, false accusation by ATF and the confusion on his court dates
intensified his distrust. When he refused to leave his remote home, the U.S. Marshalls made no
attempt to directly communicate with him. They only used third parties intermediaries, which
proved not to be effective. Had the U.S. Marshalls employed a trained negotiator to speak with
Weaver and explained the legal process to dispel erroneous beliefs about going to trial, it is
plausible that would have ended the U.S. Marshalls involvement.
The U.S. Marshall’s decision to stake out Weaver’s cabin to capture him was a fatal
decision. The stakeout ended with both a federal agent and Weaver’s son dead. The FBI learning
of the incident, sent their Crisis Management Team with Dick Rogers, Special Agent in charge.
Experienced FBI negotiators in an armored personnel carrier, arrived on the second day of the
siege prepared to make a surrender callout to the cabin. There were no hostages involved. The FBI
negotiator’s role would have been to seek a peaceful surrender. They were readily available, but
never employed. Instead, Rogers deployed snipers with instructions to shoot anyone with a
weapon.
Rogers’s strategy denied further attempts for a peaceful surrender. The fact that a federal
agent had been killed, may have caused Rogers to set the wrong tone to use lethal force instead of
negotiations. Roger’s decision on strategy to use lethal force only compounded the existing crisis.
He ignored the purpose of negotiations to save lives, including the life of perpetrators whenever
possible. Negotiations should always be used when circumstances allows the opening for
negotiators to do their job. Weaver’s wife should not have become another tragic victim.
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In summary, Weaver was anti-social, anti-government and distrusted law enforcement, but
not proven to be dangerous. When there was an arrest warrant issued, he did not run away. During
the shootout, Weaver was not seen with a weapon. Also, there were no charges against his wife.
He only refused to leave his cabin to talk to his defense counsel, negotiators or investigators.
FBI Director Louis Freeh, described the incident to the U.S. Senate hearing investigation
committee as “synonymous with exaggerated application of federal law enforcement” and stated,
“law enforcement overreacted at Ruby Ridge” (Wikipedia 11).
Hostage Event V: Waco Branch Davidians
The tragedy at Waco, Texas that involved two Federal law enforcement agencies leaves
many questions with few answers. The two Federal agencies were the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearm (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It started on February 28, 1993 when
eighty ATF agents stormed the Branch Davidians Mount Carmel compound outside of Waco. Their
goal was to execute a search warrant on the compound and an arrest warrant on weapons charges.
Vernon Wayne Howell, better known as David Koresh, was the group leader of the Branch
Davidians, a breakaway sect of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.
It is known that the Davidians were alerted that Federal agents were in the area by a rural
mailman, who happened to be the brother-in-law of David Koresh. The Davidians were prepared to
defend Mount Carmel against an intrusion by Federal agents. It is not known who fired the first shot
but when the firefight ended, four ATF agents and several Davidians were dead.
The ATF agents were replaced with the FBI, who assumed responsibility to resolve the
crisis. They treated the crisis as a “Hostage/Barricade rescue” (Tabor np). It was the FBI who called
in hostage negotiators, counterterrorist units and swat teams normally used to resolve a hostage
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crisis. Gary Noesner, FBI Lead Negotiator, was assigned as the team leader to manage the
Negotiation Operation Center (NOC). Dick Rogers, FBI special agent, was assigned to the Hostage
Response Team (HRT). Jeff Jamar the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) was the overall Incident
Commander
There were problems with communication, personalities and the chain of command from
the onset. When managing a hostage crisis, the staff responsible are also “managing information”
(Noesner 103). It is critical to a successful operation, that updated information is shared between the
NOC, HRT and Incident Commander. The decision to set up the HRT with Rogers in charge eight
miles distance from the NOC was contrary to the FBI crisis management procedures. It was known
that Rogers was no fan of hostage negotiations. The physical distance would make face to face
meetings more difficult. When the negotiation team leader expressed his dissatisfaction with the
setup, he was ignored.
On a positive note, the negotiation team found Koresh willing to talk with them. Throughout the fifty one day siege, one negotiator, characterized Koresh as either being a charismatic leader
or maybe just a good con man. Nevertheless, the negotiation team was able to obtain the release of
children two at a time with ongoing dialogue.
At 10:06 p.m. on March 1, Koresh made an offer. If the FBI allowed “him to deliver a
nationwide broadcast” ( Noesner 106) he and his followers would surrender peacefully. Koresh
wanted to speak publicly about the book of “Revelation”. Jamer approved the broadcast on the
condition that it would be a tape recording that could be screened prior to release. Koresh agreed.
At 8:15 a.m. March 2, Koresh released two more children and followed up with the release of two
elderly women and more children to bring total of released people to eighteen. That afternoon the
Christian Broadcasting Network broadcast Koresh’s tape nationwide, uncut as promised. After
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preparations began to accept the surrender, as agreed, Koresh changed his mind with the excuse
“God told him to wait” (Noesner 111).
When Koresh reneged on his commitment to come out, serious problems in reference to
further strategy developed between the NOC, HRT and SAC. Koresh gave Rogers the reason he
needed to justify an assault. Rogers used Koresh’s stalling tactics to appeal to Jamer, “my people
can get in there and secure the place in fifteen minutes” (Noesner 110). Jamer partially agreed with
Rogers adding that “it is time to teach him a lesson”. The tone was set for an assault even though
people were still being released.
The HRT, without informing the negotiation team, started a program of intimidation to
break the resolve of the Davidians. Over the objection of the negotiation team, armored cars were
driven on Davidians’ property, electricity was shut off at night, bizarre music was played during the
sleeping hours and bright lights were periodically directed at the compound. In spite of the negative
tactics, the negotiators still made some progress. On March 23, the last person was released
bringing the total to thirty five.
The effort to intimidate the Davidians, to break their resolve, and surrender did not
succeed. Instead, Koresh had a change of heart, and no more people would be released from the
compound. The negotiation team felt all their ongoing efforts to get more people released was being
compromised by the harassment efforts of the HRT. Furthermore, division between the NOC and
HRT became obvious. The negotiation team was being left out of the loop on further strategic
planning. Noesner was replaced with Clint Van Zandt, another FBI negotiator. With the change of
team leaders, no more Davidians were released.
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Jamer, Incident Commander and Rogers HRT Leader, without anyone from the negotiation
team, flew back to Washington D.C. to meet with Janet Reno, Attorney General. They made their
pitch, conditions within the compound were deteriorating and endangering the lives of children.
There were also reports of child sexual abuse. They stated tear gas could be used to drive the
Davidians from the compound. Without the negotiating team leader present to give his evaluation of
the situation, Attorney General Janet Reno approved the plan. “ On April 19, 1993 a final assault by
the FBI, led to a fire that killed seventy-four Davidians including twenty one children” (Tabor 1).
Their leader, David Koresh, was also killed in the assault. The government claimed that the
outcome was unavoidable.
Results and Critiques
The critics stressed that the matter could have been handled differently. There are several
questions that need be answered. Why didn’t ATF arrest Koresh when he was away from the
compound? How much pressure came from the FBI in Quantico to resolve the crisis to get Waco
out of the news? “The entire nation was watching and the FBI was spending about $128,000.00 a
day” (Noesner 126). Did somebody put cost over the life of the participants? The negotiators felt
they were making progress by getting a few hostages out at time, mainly children. Why not
continue negotiations? Every life is worth saving. What was the real reason for changing the
negotiating team leader? Was the sales pitch to Attorney General Reno one sided? Did Jamer and
Rogers take it personally, when Koresh reneged on his commitment to come out which motivated
the assault. It they did, they violated an FBI core principle. “Never confuse getting even with
getting what you want” (Noesner 110).
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“Congressional hearings made clear that the negotiation and tactical teams had been at
cross-purposes, and those sitting in judgement came to appreciate that the negotiation team had
been on the right track and Rogers and Jamer had got it wrong” (Noesner 131).
Hostage Event VI: Montana Freemen
Approximately three years after the disaster in Waco, Texas the FBI Crisis
Management Unit reported to Jordan, Montana. Their assignment was to enforce the application of
a federal indictment that had been obtained charging various individuals, who called themselves
Freemen, with a multitude of criminal violations. The Freemen were a small group of people who
had anti-government views and did not recognize government’s authority. They refused to pay
taxes, obey laws other than their own, obtain driver’s licenses or display tags on their vehicles.
They took refuge on a number of ranches owned by the Clark family in a remote area,
approximately twenty miles from Jordan, with a population of 450 people. They renamed their
ranch area “Justus Township”. The word Justus is meant to have a double meaning, “justice” and
“just us”.
Prior to the arrival of the FBI, local warrants had been issued against individual Freemen
for criminal acts. Reacting to the warrants being served, the Freemen publicly threatened to abduct
the sheriff and the county prosecutor and try them for treason in their court. They also threatened an
ABC news crew and stole their expensive camera equipment at gunpoint. Their increasing brazen
criminal behavior placed them in an unavoidable collision course with the government. Local law
enforcement in Jordan, twenty five miles from the “Justus Township” consisted of a sheriff, his
undersheriff and two Montana Highway Patrol. Local law enforcement personnel recognized that
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together they did not have a large enough force to take on an armed militia, consequently, they
requested assistance from the FBI.
As the standoff continued into the second week, some middle managers expressed their
concerns the incident was taking too long. Some agents wondered out loud that maybe the FBI was
gun shy and afraid to make decisions. From past practice, negotiators were aware there are
differences in opinion between the negotiating team and the tactical squad. Negotiators want the
opportunity to use their skills to bring about a peaceful resolution. Incident commanders and tactical
team commanders get impatient and push to use force to end the standoff. Negotiators are often
outranked by the incident commanders who make the final decisions, continue negotiating or use
force.
Whether FBI Director Louis Freeh received a phone call from a negotiator onsite that some
of the FBI personnel were already complaining about the length of time it was taking to resolve the
standoff is unknown. What is known is that Freeh made a conference call to all the on-site managers
in Jordan. He made it clear, speaking directly to the negotiation team leader saying, “Gary, it’s
important for you to know that as your director, I am in no hurry to end this incident. I want to make
sure that we take whatever time necessary to negotiate this out the right way”(Noesner 162). Freeh
also mandated that Gary Noesner participate in all the daily teleconference calls between him and
the on-site senior management. Everyone in the room knew that the results of Ruby Ridge and
Waco weighed heavily in the room.
In concert with Director Freeh’s directions and with fresh memories of Ruby Ridge and
Waco, the FBI was going through great pains to ensure there was not an overt display of military
clothing and equipment. Instructions were given to FBI personnel to maintain a low profile in the
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community. And, unlike Waco, Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
were conspicuously absent.
At Waco the ATF agents passed up the opportunity to arrest David Koresh while he was
out in the community. FBI agents, posing as construction workers, did arrest the Freemen’s leader
and his number one assistant while off the ranch near Jordan. The FBI’s plan, after arresting the
Freemen leaders, was to contact the five or six sites where the majority of the Freemen were
located. They wanted to give them the option of coming out peacefully rather than be subjected to a
physical assault. Their initial efforts to communicate with any Freemen failed.
When this approach appeared to be unsuccessful, the FBI solicited third party
intermediaries to speak to the Freemen on their behalf. Karl Ohs, a Montana legislator was a close
friend to the birth father of one of the women living in the Justus Township. The Freemen requested
the involvement of Charlie Duke, a right-wing member of the Colorado State Senate, well known in
militia circles. Both men were able to make contact with various Freeman willing to begin
communications. The Cause Foundation, a right-wing equivalent of the ACLU, known for
defending the legal rights of right-wing extremists in trouble with the law, offered their assistance in
the final phase of the standoff. With the blessing of the Freemen’s leader and assistance of Karl Ohs
and the Cause Foundation a surrender process was worked out.
Results and Critiques
The siege lasted for 80 days. Under the Freemen leadership, the potential for a shootout
was always there. The Freemen were well armed, distrusted government and were determined not
to surrender. An attempt to arrest individual Freemen in their homes had the potential for being
another disaster like Ruby Ridge. To their credit, the FBI administration set the tone with the local
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incident commanders and negotiators that negotiations took precedent. There was no time
limitations on the negotiators attempting to secure a peaceful resolution. When the FBI
negotiator’s initial attempt failed to make contact with the Freemen, extra steps were taken to
bring in third party intermediaries. This opened the door to communicate with individual Freemen.
With Freeh’s personal involvement, the saving of lives had priority over budgets and saving
money. The negotiators proved in the Freemen incident that, if given the time, they had the
knowledge and skills capable of resolving a crisis peacefully.
Conclusion
In conclusion, negotiation is an alternative to lethal force to resolve a hostage situation,
which can save lives. The preceding individual hostage events were selected because each
required different tactics and strategy to resolve. The details in each summary include factors
involved in the decision making process justifying assault or negotiations. The years of the
hostage events illustrated span a time frame, 1972 to 1996. One event involved two different
countries with hostages. The other events included a standoff with no hostages, religious group
secluded in a compound with illegal weapons, an anti-government malcontent, a domestic incident
and a prison riot.
Team coordination, experience, accurate intelligence, attitude and coordination between
local law enforcement agencies and government are critical in resolving a hostage incident in a
peaceful manner. The preceding hostage events compare the impact of competent leadership,
cooperation among agencies, support between team leaders versus arrogant leadership, lack of
communication and team leaders ignoring the premise of negotiations. A negative attitude toward
negotiations by the decision maker in charge of a hostage incident sets the tone on how the
situation will be resolved, which most likely will be lethal assault. A strong leader projecting a

Merkle 34.
positive approach and confidence in the negotiation process, will have a much better chance of
achieving a resolution without physical harm or death.
Attitude is very critical in maintaining a cooperative rescue operation that often includes
persons that are not trained. Small towns or cities often involve the Sheriff, Mayor or Chief of
Police in the decision making process. Lacking experience can be cause for the person in charge
making a rash decision or incapable of making a decision when confronted with a life or death
situation. Attitude of intolerance, racial bias, religious bias or “they ain’t got nothing coming”,
referring to the hostage taker, all can be problematic in coordinating an effective negotiated
resolution. However, negative attitudes are not solely relegated to the untrained leaders in small
communities. Negative attitudes contrary to negotiations can also be found in large organizations
such as the FBI or metropolitan areas that have budgets to maintain a professional crisis
management team.
In reviewing the different hostage events illustrated in this paper, the problems that led to
disastrous outcomes are obvious. The Munich, Germany hostage situation lacked a plan,
experience and the patience to stall while gathering needed resources. Additionally, the pressure
was on the German authorities to do something so the Summer Olympics could continue without a
major distraction. It is probable that with a different strategy, experienced negotiators and without
political interference, a resolution could have been reached without more Israeli deaths.
Waco and Ruby Ridge did not have hostages, however, negotiators were still needed to
attempt to reach a peaceful surrender. Unfortunately, the incident commander and tactical squad
leaders did not allow the negotiators to do their job in the Waco incident. At Ruby Ridge, the
negotiation team was present and ready to get involved, but not activated. In the Hate Factory riot,
the management had no choice but to negotiate. The management of the penitentiary and the
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treatment of inmates was profiled by previous assessments as being totally unacceptable. It is
doubtful if management would have negotiated if staff were not being held captive. Based on
preceding reports on the Penitentiary, it is very probable they would have preferred to assault.
The Montana Freemen incident also did not involve hostages. It was a problem involving a
group of people with anti-government views that disobeyed the law and refused to be served
lawful warrants. FBI negotiators were engaged to communicate with the Freemen without success.
However, the negotiation team leader took the extra step to solicit known Freemen contacts to act
as intermediaries to achieve a peaceful resolution. Unlike the Montana Freemen, the Sperryville
situation did involve hostages which could not be resolved peacefully and climaxed with the death
of the hostage taker. The decision to use lethal force was taken to the highest levels of authority
and approved by the FBI Legal Office prior to snipers being activated.
Too often it is assumed that because a person rose to a high rank in the organization, they
were also capable of managing a hostage situation or a siege. That proved to be a wrong
assumption. FBI Director, Louis Freeh recognized after the Waco disaster that a procedure was
needed to place all sieges under a unified command titled, the Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG). “The FBI would no longer simply rely on the capabilities or limitations of the local
special agent in charge” (Noesner 146). The CIRG would manage all major sieges with the
objective of ensuring proper coordination and management of the many skilled FBI resources. If
the CIRG had been in place during the Waco and Ruby Ridge incidents, the outcome may have
been different.
Summarized, negotiations save lives when everyone works as a team and supports the
negotiator’s efforts. When the negotiator is distracted by supervisors who openly project a
negative attitude and lack of confidence in the process, success is doubtful. When the negotiator is
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allowed to do his or her job, the chances of success are increased. The following quote from Frank
Bolz, New York City Police Department, coins the reason for negotiations in its entirety. No one
else has said it better.
“Whether it be a loner or a loser: whether it be the clumsy robber or a distraught former
employee, the role of law enforcement is the same, and the policy must be that life is the most
important thing. The lives of innocent, the lives of the police and even the lives of the perpetrators
are sacred. Money can be recovered, property can be replaced and perpetrators can be recaptured.
But life, once taken can never be replaced. Intelligence properly used, can insure the needed
success” (Bolz 68).
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